Farming Under Fire: The Politicization of Agriculture in the Era of Climate Transition

I. Executive Summary

This policy paper examines the ways in which climate change has transformed agriculture into an arena of political competition and conflict, how farmers in these dynamics, and the costs they bear as a result. The paper argues that while the politicization of agriculture is not new, climate change has considerably amplified these dynamics, embedding farming within three interconnected arenas: climate-related trade wars, green policymaking and technology, and political ideological conflict. Across each of these domains, farmers are repeatedly marginalized, instrumentalized, and overall insufficiently supported.

First, the paper demonstrates how agriculture functions as a bargaining tool in climate-related trade wars and geopolitical conflicts. Climate-related trade measures (i.e. tariffs, sanctions, import liberalization, etc.) are often justified in the name of sustainability or crisis response but impose disproportionate burdens on farmers. These policies therefore expose agricultural producers to market volatility and unfair competition, while their interests remain secondary to broader political objectives that, in many cases, have little to do with them. 

Second, the paper analyzes the rise of environmental policy as a form of international competition. Climate action has become a marker of technological leadership, economic strength, and political power. Within this "green race," governments adopt ambitious regulatory frameworks to maintain global standing. A prominent example is the European Union's European Green Deal (EGD) and reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While environmentally justified, these policies often shift the costs of transition onto farmers, who face rising reduced competitiveness and regulatory/administrative burdens, especially when EU standards are not matched by trade partners. This phenomenon is behind widespread farmer protests across Europe, which are discussed at-length in this paper.

Third, the paper explores how farmers have become entangled in broader political ideological conflicts. Left-leaning environmental actors and right-wing populist movements alike seek to mobilize farmers politically. However, in this process, neither side addresses their structural needs. On the left, environmental policies are often implemented without sufficient consideration of farmers’ economic realities, while right-wing populist actors capitalize on agricultural grievances without offering viable long-term solutions. As a result, farmers are reduced to political symbols rather than treated as partners in policymaking or a class in-need of real support.

The paper concludes that these dynamics are mutually reinforcing, creating a cycle of exclusion that successfully places farmers at the center of political conflict while leaving them insufficiently supported. To address this, it proposes a three-part policy framework directed at the European Commission, particularly the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development. This framework emphasizes: (1) education, to improve public and political understanding of agricultural realities; (2) recognition, to address farmers’ social and economic isolation; and (3) integration, to ensure farmer participation in policy and technological development.

Ultimately, this paper argues that achieving a sustainable and politically viable climate transition requires repositioning farmers as partners in the climate transition, not as opposition to or pawns in it.

II. Introduction

In the winter of 2023 and into the spring of 2024, hundreds of tractors grinded international highways to a halt. Tens of thousands of farmers took to the streets in what has been titled, in retrospect, the European Farmers Protests of 2023-2024. The farmers were responding to the European Green Deal (EGD), officially unveiled by the European Commission (EC) in 2019 as a climate action project with the main goal of cutting emissions in half by 2030, among countless others (European Commission, n.d.). But the years that followed revealed the reality of the policy in practice. In response to the provisions and restrictions of the EGD, farmers promptly took to the streets to express their frustrations. The result was thousands of organized protests across half of the countries in the EU over the last three years (Finger et. al, 2024). 

The protests were perhaps easy to dismiss as grievances of a politically conservative rural constituency resistant to change. But upon closer inspection, the stories behind the spectacle told a different and more troubling story. Farmers told stories of droughts that had turned their soil barren, of harvests lost to flooding, of seasons that no longer behaved as they once had - and now, regulations they had received little help understanding, alternatives they could not afford to implement, and cheap imports undercutting the prices they depended on to survive (Finger et. al, 2024).

Caught between the physical consequences of a destabilizing climate and the regulatory demands of the EU's green transition - of which the EGD is a salient institutional expression - farmers across the continent reached a breaking point in 2023-2024. Their mobilization was not without effect: the EC effectively reevaluated several key provisions of the original EGD package, adjusted for necessary accommodations, and developed/enhanced various tools of transition (European Commission, 2025a, 2025b). 

These amends aside, however, the event put a puzzling paradox on display: agriculture is central to climate policy, yet farmers are increasingly politically marginalized in the debate and surrounding policy. Farmers are essential actors in the climate transition, yet they are largely neglected in the processes involved. This neglect puts them at risk of political vulnerability. At the center of the conflict, their livelihoods are easily exploited by corporations, political activists, and governments to serve broader agendas. 

Before proceeding, it is important to frame the context and define a number of terms. Firstly, it is important to understand agriculture and farming, and in what ways they overlap and differ. On the one hand, agriculture may be broadly defined as the “science or practice of farming, including cultivation of the soil for the growing of crops and the rearing of animals to provide food, wool, and other products” (Oxford Dictionary). Farming, therefore, is a more precise term that refers to the “activity or business of growing crops and raising livestock” (Oxford Dictionary). Said differently, agriculture is the broad term encompassing policy, economics, research, food systems, and logistics, while farming is the system through which inputs (i.e. sunlight, nutrients, water, labour) are transformed into outputs (i.e. market-ready products) using mainly biological processes. Farmers, then, are defined as those who “owns or manages a farm”, or anyone else who may work on a farm for income (Oxford Dictionary). They are the principal actors in farming, however, as an industry, agriculture widely includes many professions outside of farmers. Broadly, it is estimated to employ close to 20 million people, including researchers, politicians, business specialists, and more (EFFAT, n.d.).

This policy paper examines the relationship between climate change, politics, and agriculture, with a focus on the European Union. It is addressed to the European Commission, and specifically to the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, as the institutional body responsible for both the design of the EU's ecological transition and the welfare of the agricultural communities it affects. It asks: how has climate change intensified the political instrumentalization of agriculture, and what consequences does this have for farmers? This question is particularly urgent at a moment when agricultural systems are increasingly mobilized to serve competing political objectives, while those who sustain them face mounting economic and social pressures with limited political voice. This paper argues that climate change has transformed agriculture into a terrain of political contestation across three arenas: climate-related trade wars, green policymaking and technology, and political ideological conflict. Across each, farmers are consistently positioned as instruments of broader political agendas while bearing the material costs of decisions in which they have little meaningful influence - deepening a structural condition of political neglect that this paper seeks both to diagnose and to address. After examining agriculture's role as a geopolitical bargaining tool, as a site of environmental and technological competition, and as an arena of ideological conflict, this paper will end by proposing reforms designed designed to help farmers become partners - as opposed to pawns in political agendas - in the face and future of climate change in Europe. 

III. Context, Literature & Approach

The geopolitical significance of agriculture is well established. Agricultural systems have been shaped by external forces that govern land for centuries: dynasties, industrialization, colonial expansion, liberalization, and war have each left their mark on how farming is organized, regulated, and valued. The result has been a succession of politically constructed agricultural systems, institutionalized through policy frameworks, trade agreements, and subsidy structures that reflect the projection of geopolitics. Farming, being simultaneously a private livelihood, a domestic economic sector, a public good, and a national security asset, is a pillar of virtually every economy in the world. It is for this reason that agriculture is so heavily implicated in geopolitics: because food supply is power, agricultural policy inevitably becomes an instrument of political strategy extending well beyond the field (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2013). Scholars working at the intersection of international relations and food systems have documented how agribusiness is simultaneously a cause and a consequence of political dynamics at every level. One foundational work in this regard is Robert J. Herring's 2014 The Oxford Handbook of Food, Politics, and Society, which argues that global civil society is in fact organized around the “production, distribution, and consequences” of food (Herring, 2015). More recent research has revealed that this geopolitical dimension is only deepening. The Emerging Geopolitics of Food, published by the Wageningen University and Research in collaboration with The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, demonstrates that food security and agricultural trade are becoming increasingly central to European geopolitical strategy (Lei Wageningen, 2013). 

The Emerging Geopolitics of Food is representative of a larger, well-studied body of work that studies just how much and in what ways climate change has changed CAP. Moreover, this body of work supports that climate change has significantly intensified the political importance of agriculture. On the one hand, agriculture is a major contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, particularly through livestock production, land use, and deforestation. On the other hand, it is also one of the sectors most directly affected by climate change, facing increasing risks from extreme weather events, soil degradation, and shifting ecological conditions. In fact, arguably the most outstanding aspect of the protests was that they challenged the common narrative that casts farmers as perpetrators of climate change by reminding the public that they are also among its greatest victims. Unlike most, their livelihoods depend entirely on the stability of natural systems that climate change rapidly and unpredictably destabilizes. In other words, before any policy demand is made, climate change is already challenging their work. Moreover, this dual role of agriculture places it at the center of climate policy, making it both a target of regulation and a site of adaptation.

A related and growing body of scholarship focuses specifically on how these climate-driven policy changes have affected farmers on the ground. As governments and international institutions accelerate efforts toward environmental transition, agriculture has become a key arena in which competing political, economic, and ecological priorities converge. Climate policies aimed at reducing emissions, promoting sustainable practices, and advancing renewable energy infrastructure often rely on the transformation of agricultural systems and land use. These policies can impose significant economic and practical constraints on farmers, who must navigate new regulatory frameworks while maintaining viable livelihoods. The studies that focus on this phenomenon document a wide variety of concerns, ranging from impenetrable bureaucratic frameworks to sudden and significant financial burdens (Lapple, et. al, 2026). Research consistently finds that farmers are deeply critical of the top-down manner in which agricultural transition policies are designed and implemented, and that this experience of exclusion is driven not only by economic barriers but by social and cultural ones as well (Ryan & Hoes, 2025; Dublin T.U., 2025; Franz, et. al, 2025). Scholars in this field have concluded that policymakers have not substantively embraced farmers' perceptions, knowledge, and needs as legitimate contributions to climate adaptation discourse (Soubry, et. al, 2020). The result has been a cascade of compounding pressures across the continent, culminating most visibly in the 2023-2024 protest wave.

This evolving dynamic has heightened the political visibility of agriculture, transforming it into an arena in which actors - governments, corporations, and political movements - pursue competing objectives. Understanding how and why agriculture has assumed this role is therefore essential to analyzing the broader relationship between climate change, political decision-making, and the lived realities of those who sustain food production systems.

But this geopolitical dimension of the agricultural industry has implications for decision-making. As power is concentrated upward (i.e. in institutions, trade bodies, and government ministries), the costs of the decisions flow downward onto those in the field. These are farmers - not the owners of industrial capital, the architects of trade agreements, or the authors of green legislation. Their existence is why treating agriculture purely as an economic sector to be optimized or transitioned is to ignore the human dimensions that make it irreducible to market logic alone. There are dimensions of culture, identity, and intergenerational inheritance in farming that demand to be considered (Lecuyer, et. al, 2025). When policy fails to account for these, misrecognition occurs, defined as a community consistently reduced to a symbol, an instrument, or an obstacle, rather than engaged as a group of people with legitimate needs, practical knowledge, and the right to participate in decisions that shape their existence (Lecuyer, et. al, 2025). It is for this reason that this paper does not only analyze agricultural policy from above, but deliberately uses a History from Below approach to incorporate the experiences, knowledge, and agency of farmers into the policy it proposes.

In other words, there is evidence to suggest that the political neglect or instrumentalization of farmers is not, in itself, a new phenomenon. This is supported by the work of Dutch sociologist Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, who argued in his book The New Peasantries: Struggles for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization (2008), that contemporary struggles for farmer autonomy are embedded in a longer history in which farming communities have been structurally associated with peasantry and, consequently, with political and economic subordination. This is why this policy paper does not seek to determine whether climate change has created such dynamics, but rather to examine how it has intensified them. It will do so by identifying three key ways in which agriculture has become a tool of political competition: as an instrument of geopolitical bargaining, as a site of environmental policy and technological rivalry, and as a terrain of ideological conflict. 

IV. How Farmers “Lose”: Climate Change-Related Trade Wars

1. Trade Weaponization 

Trade-fueled disputes are as old as civilization itself. Some records trace them as far back as Ancient Greece and the Peloponnesian War, when Athens banned the Megarians — citizens of Megara, a Spartan ally — from its ports in the 430s BC, an episode recounted by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War (Feldhaus, et. al, 2020). But the phenomenon has grown considerably more consequential with globalization, which has deepened economic interconnectedness, expanded trade flows, and amplified the effects of their disruption. There is growing concern that the current structure of global trade is particularly conducive to trade weaponization, defined as the "employment of trade tools to induce a trade partner to change its practices in any issue-area by exploiting its economic vulnerabilities" (Feldhaus, et. al, 2020). This unprecedented network of economic interdependence - sometimes among countries engaged in geopolitical rivalry - creates conditions favorable to the political exploitation of trade restrictions. While international trade is for the most part welfare-enhancing, it also generates relations of asymmetric interdependence: one party may lose considerably more than the other when economic ties are suspended. It is this asymmetry that makes weaponization possible (Feldhaus, et. al, 2020).

Trade weaponization takes many forms and can be understood as a spectrum. It includes tariffs, quotas, sanctions, import liberalization, and export restrictions, whose effects range from bureaucratic adjustments noticed only by senior officials to large-scale and deliberate manipulation of food supplies, access, or quality with the purpose of subduing a targeted group (Mudie-Mantz, et. al, n.d.). The most extreme forms — manufacturing shortages, manipulating prices, and directly depriving populations of food access — have been prohibited under international law since 1966, when the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights affirmed the "fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger." Rising conflicts in the aftermath of decolonization, notably in Africa and Asia, led to the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, which codified that "it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works." These norms were reaffirmed in 1998 by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, whose Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) classifies the intentional use of starvation as a method of warfare as a war crime (Mudie-Mantz, et. al, n.d.). While this most extreme form of food weaponization has become less widespread, it has not disappeared. Far more common, however, are the less catastrophic but equally consequential trade wars - defined as situations in which countries attempt to damage each other's trade through tariffs or quota restrictions - which can persist for years (Oxford Dictionary).

2. Climate Change & Trade Weaponization

Climate change has demonstrably amplified international trade dynamics. Trade is affected not only by the extreme weather events that climate change produces - disrupting supply chains, damaging transport infrastructure, and restricting the movement of people and goods - but also by the policies designed to mitigate it (Grantham Research Institute, 2023a). Many of these policies extend beyond domestic regulation to target international trade specifically, shifting patterns of comparative advantage (Grantham Research Institute, 2023b). The data is clear: the sector most affected by this intersection of climate change and trade is agriculture (Grantham Research Institute, 2023a). Changes in temperature, heatwaves, land degradation, shifts in precipitation levels, water stress, and drought all damage agricultural output and drive up food prices globally.

Taken together, this climate dimension has revealed something important: farmers are always affected by agricultural policy competition, yet are rarely considered in its design. It is their products that go unsold, their livelihoods that are placed at risk - as a consequence of political agendas and long-standing conflicts that are frequently far removed from the realities of the farm. Because climate change agendas are driven by political and economic ambitions that can foster geopolitical rivalry, farmers can become collateral damage - or, worse, a deliberate bargaining chip between feuding governments. They are, in effect, sacrificed for geopolitical gains without their consent or compensation. And because farming communities rarely possess the lobbying power to resist such instrumentalization, they have limited means of pushing back against the policies that affect them most.

3. Case Study: The Russian Invasion, Ukrainian Imports & the EGD

This dynamic is illustrated clearly by the European Union's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the full-scale invasion, the EU rapidly implemented a series of trade measures designed to support the Ukrainian economy, including the suspension of tariffs and quotas on Ukrainian agricultural exports. So-called "solidarity lanes" were established to ensure export flows, helping to stabilize both European and global food systems. As Ukraine's dependence on the EU as an export destination grew, what began as an emergency trade arrangement gradually became a structural challenge for the bloc. Brussels sought simultaneously to keep the Ukrainian economy afloat and to signal political solidarity with Kyiv in the face of Russian aggression. In this context, agriculture became a central component of the EU's geopolitical strategy - a tool of both economic assistance and symbolic political commitment (Yasevych, 2026).

These measures were politically and morally justified at the international level. Their domestic consequences, however, exposed significant tensions within the European agricultural sector. A substantial influx of Ukrainian agricultural products - particularly grain - flooded into neighboring EU member states including Poland, Romania, and Hungary. Due to lower production costs in Ukraine and logistical constraints that prevented goods from being efficiently redistributed beyond border regions, large quantities of these imports remained within local markets. The result was price declines, market saturation, and storage shortages, directly undermining the position of European farmers who could not compete with cheaper foreign goods (Taran, 2025).

The situation was most acute in Poland - one of the epicenters of the 2023-2024 protests - where farmers organized large-scale demonstrations, blocked border crossings, and demanded government intervention (Arab News, 2024). Their demands were twofold: close the border, and halt the Green Deal. Adjusting to the European Green Deal was already a significant burden; doing so while simultaneously competing against far cheaper imports made the situation untenable for many (Arab News, 2024). Ukrainian agriculture thus became entangled in a much broader European debate: how to reconcile food security, climate goals, and farmer incomes in an era of geopolitical instability (Yasevych, 2026).

However, these immediate triggers (Ukrainian imports) were underpinned by more fundamental and systemic concerns, including perceived low and volatile profits, high input costs, the market power of retailers and other downstream actors, and stringent environmental and bureaucratic requirements, all within an ever-evolving political landscape. Notably, the increasing environmental ambitions of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Farm-to-Fork strategy heightened farmer dissatisfaction. These standards are seen as imposing additional costs on farmers, exacerbated by inflation and particularly sharply rising input prices – such as for energy and fertilisers – since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Farmers also face increased risks from climate change and uncertainty over trade agreements (Finger et. al, 2024). 

4. Conclusion

The Ukrainian case illustrates how agriculture is mobilized as a flexible policy instrument in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, while the structural vulnerabilities of those who work the land are insufficiently accounted for in policy design. The EU's support for Ukraine reflects legitimate and necessary political commitments. Yet the resulting impact on European farmers reveals a persistent asymmetry between those who make decisions and those who bear their consequences. Farmers are expected to absorb the costs of policies designed to serve wider geopolitical goals - reinforcing their position as politically instrumentalized yet economically exposed. When agriculture is deployed as a tool of geopolitical strategy, it can generate internal inequalities that ultimately destabilize the very sector it purports to support. And as climate-driven conflicts affecting trade and agriculture intensify, farmers face an ever-growing risk of being caught in the crossfire of decisions made entirely without them (Swanson, 2023).

V. How Farmers “Lose”: The Green Policy & Technology Race

1. The Rise in Climate Policy & Reasons

This second section examines the aforementioned increase in climate-related tensions. Even a decade ago, in 2015, the total number of laws and executive policies related to climate change had already surpassed 1,000 - twenty times higher than in 1997, when the number stood at just over 50 (Harrisson, 2017). This trend has accelerated further in recent years, particularly following the Paris Agreement in 2015. Indeed, “75% of the adaptation-relevant laws and policies [that exist today] [have been] adopted since the Paris Agreement in 2015 and 46% since 2020”: “Adaptation has become more explicit in overarching multi-sectoral climate change laws and policies, evolving with political priorities. The prominence of adaptation as a national objective is beginning to translate into laws and policies across adaptation-relevant sectors” (Grantham Research Institute, 2026).

The rise in the number of climate change-related laws and policies is due to various reasons, one of which is, of course, the worsening state of the climate and the urgency it demands (Plummer, 2026). However, it is also because certain changes have made these regulations and restrictions mandatory. Examples include the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the aforementioned Paris Agreement, as well as more recent events like the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2025 ruling that “States have an obligation to protect the environment from greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and act with due diligence and cooperation to fulfill this obligation… The Court further ruled that if States breach these obligations, they incur legal responsibility and may be required to cease the wrongful conduct, offer guarantees of non-repetition and make full reparation depending on the circumstances” (UN News, 2025).  

This acceleration of climate policy around the world is also largely rooted in the fact that climate change - and reversing its progression - is often framed as a “race” (United Nations, n.d.). This is done understandably, since the Earth is approaching temperature levels from which it would be unable to recover. However, this “race” concept lends itself well to intra-state competition. After all, climate policy is a way to showcase status, technological innovation, and moral supremacy. For this reason, countries that are not on the frontlines of innovation or progress are frequently labeled as “falling behind” - economically, strategically, and technologically: “Failure to develop sovereign green tech capabilities risks economic marginalization and strategic vulnerabilities” (Climate Council, 2025; Nexus Climate, n.d.). In some cases, this competition (often driven by other political agendas) sometimes overshadows the original intention of bettering the environment. One such example is the US-China race for creating electric vehicles (EVs). What started as a climate-focused initiative has evolved over time into a competition over technological supremacy, economic power, and national security, connecting back to the larger, longstanding US-China trade wars. While reducing emissions may have been part of the initial catalyst, the current race is one dominated by geopolitical concerns, mainly consisting of the US viewing China’s control over the EV supply chain as an existential threat to its automotive industry (Yusko, 2025).

2. The Hidden Cost 

In many respects, this competition has positive effects. It accelerates the development of critical clean technologies, reduces costs, and stimulates investment in decarbonization. Such dynamics foster innovation in renewable energy, carbon capture, and circular economy models, all of which are essential to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions (United Nations, n.d.). However, this rapid expansion of green policy and technological innovation carries a significant, often overlooked cost: its impact on farmers. Excluded from both policy making and technological inventions that directly affect their work, farmers are frequently left behind in the race to adopt these new practices: “Economic pressures and exclusion from development of Government policies have been identified as the main barriers to the uptake of sustainable farming practices, new research has found. The research carried out by the Agri Mental Health group between UCD and TU Dublin found that the main barriers to sustainable farming practices in Ireland are practical and social, rather than ideological” (O’Brien, 2025). 

3. Case Study: European Union Environmental Regulation

Perhaps the most obvious example of this dynamic is EU initiatives like the EGD and its subset, the Farm-to-Fork Strategy. Through these two policy frameworks,  the EU has sought to position itself as a global leader in climate governance, promoting ambitious targets for emissions reduction, biodiversity preservation, and sustainable food systems. These policies have introduced a number of reforms to the CAP have introduced “green conditionality”, requiring farmers to meet environmental standards in order to access subsidies, while additional regulations have sought to “reduce pesticide use, promote organic farming, and protect ecosystems and enhance biodiversity” (European Commission, 2026). 

These policies are justifiably motivated by genuine environmental concerns and, simultaneously, by the EU’s broader ambition to be a global leader in establishing environmental norms, as it is a largely regulatory power. In this sense, agriculture becomes a key means through which the EU performs and consolidates its environmental leadership (Nexus Climate, n.d.). Moreover, because the ecological transition is frequently framed as a moral imperative - and because states are at risk of “falling behind” - little-to-no space is left for negotiation, particularly for farmers at the lower end of the socio-political hierarchy. Within this framework, resistance from farmers is frequently interpreted as backwardness, rather than as a rational response to economic constraints and structural pressures. 

Because these climate policies are fueled - at least in part - by the pursuit of status, image, and power, they naturally fall out of touch with the farmers forced to adapt to them. This phenomenon can have the effect of “tapping into wider feelings of rural disconnection. How else could the Netherlands — with just 50,000 farmers — deliver nearly 1.5 million votes for the BBB (Dutch BoerBurgerBeweging, or Farmer-Citizen Movement) in early 2023? These movements [such as BBB] are really about representing those living outside big cities who feel excluded from policymaking in national capitals. And they are giving a voice to small-town residents who feel threatened by governments’ increasingly rigid approach to social and environmental objectives” (Drea, 2023). In other words, growing opposition toward the proposed Nature Restoration Law, for example, (a subset of the EU Biodiversity Strategy within the EGD) should be viewed as a symptom of a rural Europe that feels increasingly alienated from urban policymaking elites, rather than a flat-out unwillingness to adapt (Drea, 2023). It was this precise phenomenon that was at the heart of what many of the 2023-2024 European Farmers Protests were about (Lapple, et. al, 2026; Finger et. al, 2024). 

4. Conclusion

Despite having justified intentions, many green politics neglect the realities of those expected to bear the brunt of adopting them. Likewise, many technological innovations are created, but often without the consultation of those expected to use them, and without consideration of the economic cost of this transition. Farmers are thus expected to undertake significant transformations without always being provided with the practical tools, financial security, or institutional support necessary to do so: “Farmers’ misgivings aren’t about denying climate change - which impacts them greatly - or misunderstanding the actions required to mitigate its worst effects. They’re about the lack of realism in Brussels when it comes to setting time frames to achieve the EU’s environmental targets - because it is those time frames that will collapse rural economies” (O’Brien, 2026; Drea, 2023). 

VI. How Farmers “Lose”: Political Ideological Conflict

1. Political Divide in the Era of Climate Change

There is little doubt that climate change has intensified political divisions. Not only has it deepened existing divides between political parties by providing a highly contentious issue around which to mobilize, but it has also contributed to the emergence and growth of new political movements. The climate crisis - and the question of how to respond to it - is no longer merely a policy issue debated within national parliaments or at the European level; it is fundamentally reshaping political systems. As noted, it is “driving a reconfiguration of EU-level political alliances and prizing apart the decades-long, mainstream pro-European coalition” (Catt, 2025; Jones & Youngs, 2025).

2. Exploited by All, Served by None

This heated political climate created by climate change has created a fascinating and devastating paradox. In sum, this paradox is rooted in a failure of both the political “left” and “right” to authentically, deeply, and comprehensively engage with the long-term needs of farmers. The result is that farmers become institutionally neglected and thereby vulnerable to being used as political pawns. As both left and right move to claim and use them as symbols in a broader ideological conflict, their core needs remain unfulfilled. 

On the one hand, the political “left” (particularly democratic and green parties), often positioned as the driver of the ecological transition, tends to prioritize the urgency of climate action in ways that overshadow the material realities faced by those expected to bear its costs, like farmers. Resistance to environmental policies is frequently interpreted as a sign of misinformation, misunderstanding, or ideological backwardness, rather than as a rational response to economic constraints and structural pressures. Empirical research supports this disconnect, indicating that climate policy leaders do not “substantively embrace farmers’ perceptions as a contribution to adaptation discourse” (Soubry et al., 2020).

Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, green policy and technological innovation are not driven solely by environmental necessity. They are also shaped by considerations of political prestige, economic competitiveness, and global leadership. As a result, policymakers may be reluctant to amend or “water down” targets out of concern that doing so would weaken international standing or “shake confidence in foreign investment” (Catt, 2025). These motivations further distance environmental policymaking from the practical realities of agricultural life, contributing to a sense of disconnection among farmers.

If leftist green policies continue to be created without farmer consultation, the left will continue to signal that there is no place for farmer collaboration in green policy creation. The result will be demands that farmers cannot meet, collapsing supply chains, the abandonment and foreclosure of farms, and a rural community that feels fundamentally disconnected from and at-odds with a greener future.

On the other hand, the European political “right” (particularly populist and far-right movements) has increasingly sought to capitalize on farmer discontent. These actors often present themselves as defenders of farmers’ livelihoods, positioning themselves alongside the “common man” and framing agricultural grievances as part of a broader moral struggle between “ordinary people” and distant political elites - typical features of populism. This has been evident in the opposition of the far-right in France to the EU–Mercosur agreement, as well as in the rise of the Dutch BoerBurgerBeweging (BBB) in response to nitrogen regulation disputes (Gueye, 2025).

However, this alignment is rhetorical. Instead of addressing the structural challenges facing the agricultural sector, these movements often transform “genuine agrarian grievances into political capital” (Gueye, 2025). They offer cultural recognition and criticize environmental “elitism,” but ultimately mobilize farmer discontent as anti-establishment rhetoric (Taylor & Horton, 2024). As such, their political engagement is rooted less in resolving farmers’ challenges than in sustaining the grievances associated with them. This phenomenon, which can be understood as a form of “populist exploitation,” risks deepening political divisions while leaving underlying issues unresolved (Gueye, 2025).

The consequences of this dynamic extend beyond the agricultural sector. When climate policy becomes framed as a partisan issue - associated with one side of the political spectrum - there is a risk of broader policy stagnation. If right-wing actors continue to oppose climate measures through populist rhetoric, misinformation, or by positioning farmers in opposition to environmental science, legitimate progress on climate action may be delayed. In this case, the long-term consequences (i.e. rising temperatures, increased droughts, extreme weather events, and disrupted supply chains) would disproportionately affect farmers (Grantham Research Institute, 2023a).

3. The Human Cost

This ideological instrumentalization is compounded by the already precarious conditions of agricultural life. Farming remains one of the most dangerous professions in Europe, with work-related fatalities estimated to be 233% higher than in other industries. Even this figure likely underestimates the scale of the problem, as many workplace incidents go unreported or uninvestigated (CORDIS, n.d.).

In addition to physical risk, farmers face significant mental health challenges. These are often linked to economic pressure, geographic isolation, and limited access to mental health services. Many farmers report feeling undervalued and disconnected from broader society, noting a lack of public understanding of the realities and pressures associated with agricultural work. This sense of isolation is frequently associated with higher rates of depression and anxiety (Footprint, 2022). Indeed, suicide rates among farmers are estimated to be approximately 20% higher than national averages in many EU Member States (CORDIS, n.d.).

Taken together, these conditions work to highlight the human cost of political neglect. When farmers require greater support, recognition, and inclusion, they are instead often caught in a cycle of instrumentalization and marginalization. They need not to be symbols, but sincerely engaged with.

4. Conclusion

Said succinctly, the climate crisis has exacerbated political divides in a way that puts farmers at the center of the conflict, both as a weapon of the ideological arsenal of political parties and as those most directly affected by the policy made - or not made. Yet, despite the relevance to this issue, their needs in the face of the climate transition are seriously and carefully considered by neither the political “left” or “right.” While the former forces farmers to adapt to policies they are fundamentally underequipped to undertake, the latter exploits this anger and vulnerability for their own political gain, risking climate backsliding in the process, which, of course, directly impacts farmers once again. Being caught in this political ideological turmoil also risks exacerbating preexisting struggles and predisposing farmers to more severe (rural) isolation.  

VII. Policy Recommendations For a Win-Win Future

1. A Future Without Intervention

“Climate change, as well as mitigation and adaptation measures, will create winners and losers, exacerbating social inequalities” (Akguc, et. al, n.d.). The social, political, and economic implications of not intervening in this issue are obvious - and startling. 

Firstly, if farmers continue to be treated as collateral damage in climate-related trade conflicts, they are likely to feel increasingly abandoned by their governments. Secondly, when these broader geopolitical dynamics drive the development of green policies and technologies without their inclusion, farmers will feel not only sidelined but also unfairly burdened—transformed from collateral damage into scapegoats. Thirdly, if these dynamics persist and further deepen political divisions, farmers may be compelled to align with the political actors who appear to represent them most effectively: “Rural voters will come to desert traditional centrist pro-EU parties and flock to wider protest movements that harbor much more uncertain attitudes toward Brussels instead” (Drea, 2023).

Such movements are often associated not only with environmental skepticism but also with euroskepticism, as research suggests that support for populist actors is frequently driven more by nationalism than by coherent environmental ideology (Zuk, 2025). If left unaddressed, this trend risks undermining support for the EU’s broader climate agenda which, while imperfect, remains both necessary and directionally aligned with the goal of mitigating environmental degradation. Ultimately, failure to act would contribute not only to political fragmentation, but also to worsening environmental conditions, which, once again, directly threaten agricultural production and farmer livelihoods.

Moreover, these dynamics risk intensifying existing feelings of exclusion, anti-establishment sentiment, and social isolation among farmers, who already face significant structural challenges in this regard (Footprint, 2023). In this sense, the three dimensions outlined in this paper are not isolated phenomena. Rather, they are interconnected, collectively reinforcing a cycle that increasingly marginalizes farmers and places them in structurally vulnerable positions.

2. EU Amendments To Date

It is important to fairly acknowledge the amendments to the EGD that the EC has already made. As early as 2024, in response to the rather surprisingly effective Farmer Protests, the EC began revising provisions made by the EGD.  This 2024 package focused on "simplifying the policy and providing more flexibility for farmers” (European Commission, 2025a). This package aimed to increase “flexibility for farmers and national administrations and make requirements more compatible with farming realities”(European Commission, 2025a). Main changes proposed include the following: increasing attractiveness of the simplified payment scheme for smaller farms; facilitating access to finance and investment support in particular for young/smaller farmers; better recognition of organic farming; incentives for farmers to protect peatlands and wetlands; reducing on-farm control burden; strengthening the resilience and preparedness of EU farmers for crisis; and reinforcing the capacity of the CAP to provide support to farmers affected by natural disaster or animal diseases (European Commission, 2025a). 

The EC released another “ CAP simplification and competitiveness package” with the goal of further “simplifying the implementation of the CAP, enhancing farmers’ competitiveness, and improving their resilience in crisis” (European Commission, 2025a). The package was far more detailed than its predecessor, and featured a variety of aims, such as increasing attractiveness of the simplified payment scheme for smaller farms; facilitating access to finance and investment support in particular for young and smaller farmers; better recognition of organic farming; [providing] incentives for farmers to protect peatlands and wetlands; strengthening the resilience and preparedness of EU farmers for crisis; reinforcing the capacity of the CAP to provide support to farmers affected by natural disaster; increasing flexibility and subsidiarity for EU countries to adapt CAP support to changing circumstances; and providing greater flexibility for EU countries in adapting their CAP Strategic Plans (European Commission, 2025a).  

Furthermore, as recent as 2026, further simplification is on the way. In January, the EC adopted an addition 9 acts under CAP following the simplification roadmap of 2025 with the goal of combatting “unnecessary bureaucracy and regulatory burdens” by “reducing red tape, easing administrative burdens for farmers and national administrations, and, in some cases, saving farmers across all Member States up to €215 million annually” (European Commission, 2025b). In some cases, farmers might even see around a 20% reduction in the time spent on CAP related administration (European Commission, 2025b). 

Also ongoing is the European Just Transition Mechanism, which has been active since 2020 in conjunction with the EGD. This mechanism, while not perfect, seeks to mobilize around €55 billion over from 2021-2027 in the regions most affected by the EGD (European Commission, n.d.). However, the framework has been found to lack key elements and be underdeveloped in comparison to the green policy ambitions proposed by the EU (Akguc, et. al, n.d.). 

3. Further Policy Suggestions

Although promising, many of these EU policy packages remain largely reactionary rather than proactive. Moreover, few of them directly address the underlying issue of how and why farmers are not initially considered or meaningfully included in the climate transition. In other words, deeper and more structural reforms are necessary. This final section therefore outlines a three-part policy framework aimed at educating, recognizing, and integrating farmers into the wider socio-political arena in the face of climate change:

a. Education

Farmers must no longer be treated as political pawns or symbolic images within broader debates. This means dismissing extremist rhetoric that either dismisses farmers as backwards (in the case of the left) or use of farmers' struggles as anti-establishment ammunition (in the case of the right). Politicians and the public alike ought to become more informed about the specific needs and struggles of farmers and their respective domains. More specifically, there is a clear need for greater public education regarding what farming entails and what sustainable transition processes actually require. Existing research demonstrates that increased exposure to agricultural practices improves awareness not only of farming itself but also of sustainability challenges and solutions. Expanding opportunities for individuals to work on farms or engage directly with agricultural environments could foster a deeper understanding of the labor, knowledge, and constraints involved. Such engagement can, in turn, cultivate greater appreciation for farmers and for the complexities of ecological transition. This can help consumers better understand the cost structures behind organic and sustainable production, potentially increasing their willingness to support ecological producers. 

b. Recognition

In addition to education on farming to promote understanding and combat political exploitation, greater emphasis must be placed on recognizing farmers both materially and socially. This includes addressing mental health challenges within the agricultural sector, which are normally exacerbated by economic pressure, isolation, and lack of institutional support. Recognition should extend not only to farmers’ role in food production, but also to their efforts to adapt, innovate, and implement environmentally sustainable practices. By valuing both their work and efforts to transition, policymakers and the public alike can help reduce feelings of isolation and underappreciation. This, in turn, may lower resistance to policy measures, as farmers are more likely to engage with transitions in which they feel seen, respected, and supported.

c. Integration

Lastly, farmers' knowledge is rarely integrated as a valuable contribution to food systems adaptation, a gap remains. Integrating more substantive qualitative methods into farmer perception research, as well as incorporating these perspectives into risk management and climate adaptation frameworks, would allow farmers’ knowledge and experiences to be more accurately reflected across the field (Soubry, et. al, 2020). Beyond research, this integration must extend to policy and technological innovation processes. Including farmers directly in the design and implementation of green policies would help ensure that these measures are both practical and effective. Findings suggest that farmers’ green values are positively associated with green innovative intention and green technology adoption behavior, and that green innovative intention itself mediates this relationship (Gao, et. al, 2022). In essence, fostering a more positive and collaborative relationship between farmers and green policy can directly contribute to increased innovation and adoption of sustainable practices. Moreover, a more participatory approach to policymaking would help address the persistent sense of exclusion experienced by many farmers, potentially improving overall well-being while strengthening their integration into broader socio-political processes.