Emotions in Politics: A Double Standard
Plato’s “Book X” of The Republic asserts that, as humans, ruling over our emotions is a prerequisite to ruling over others. Said differently, emotions ought to be ruled by reason, and those individuals who are ruled by reason are then qualified to rule over (irrational) others. This takes place in the form of philosopher rulers who think ahead, measure, calculate, analyze, organize, and rationally weigh options. This way, the city, or polis, becomes ordered and devoid of emotion (Miller). But does it? Can it? Separate from the question of if emotions have a legitimate role in politics, which is to be later explored, I believe the problematic assumption upon which Plato’s ideal city rests must first be examined: that humans are capable of being purely rational agents. This essay will attempt to dismantle that belief and then build a new, refined argument on that foundation. This new argument puts forth that politics and emotions are inextricably linked, and that what we are truly concerned with is instead a question of whose emotions we choose to make space for.
Modern neurobiological scientific research has shown emotions are what drive thinking (Varlas). Politics and emotions are inextricably linked. The polis involves human lives, experiences, and feelings. Can one be truly politically represented by someone who has never emotionally or physically felt the same fear for safety, the same hunger, same desperation, the same physical pain of labor, or menstruation, or childbirth, or the physical exhaustion of nursing, or being kept awake by sleepless children? How can the philosophers of the ideal city rule inclusively through reason alone, as prescribed by Plato? Without feeling, these elite rulers - often described as technocrats - face the impossible task of understanding the lives of those that they rule. This, too, may lend itself to utilitarianism. Equating rational choices with good choices is uncomfortably similar to the utilitarian pattern of equalizing good consequences with good actions. This being said, while it is true that Plato undervalues emotions, it is also true that politics should not be overly emotional. I would instead argue for a moderate approach, one that acknowledges the harmful impacts of excessive emotion while simultaneously recognizing their value in rational decision-making.
Now having established the need for emotions in politics, the question of gender as it relates to these emotions becomes relevant. To begin, it is important to acknowledge that Plato never argued for the active suppression of women nor their exclusion from politics. Still, it would be unwise to call Plato a feminist of any kind. Even if not explicitly, many of his typologies and hierarchies lend themselves to the repression of women. Much of his political thought, including the idea of ‘rule of reason’, has been the foundation on which exclusionary politics has been built, as feminist thinkers of the modern era have pointed out. It’s true that the political thought that has evolved out of Plato’s ‘rule of reason’ tends to favor men in power. This school of thought may be associated with the following claims: (1) emotions can be confined to women, (2) we can remove emotions from politics, and (3) this can be done by removing women from politics. As stated previously, it is both unlikely and undesirable that politics will ever be stripped of emotion. Likewise, the belief that emotions are confined to women has been repeatedly proven incorrect. Having collapsed the first two statements, the third and final argument fails.
At the same time, the common feminist counter-argument that women are equally as rational as men proves to be just as problematic. Feminist thinkers often try to justify women’s place in politics by disputing the claim that women are emotional, and instead assert that women are equally detached from emotion as their male counterparts. This argument, too, fails, because it treats men and women as the exact same, ignoring differences between the sexes. Women are not the same as men, in neither their biological processes nor social functions. Counter to common feminist thought, this is not to say that women are less rational. It is mistaken to believe the men of the polis are more rational than others in the first place.
I instead argue that men do use emotion in politics, and always have. This emotion is either disguised as reason or accepted as wisdom. This means male emotions have been ingrained into the fabrics of society and politics for centuries. This makes them both (1) difficult to identify, and (2), very mainstream. In other words, accepting men’s emotions has been a deliberate choice - a choice that can, and should, be made again to actively include and accept the emotions of women. Because emotions are so highly interconnected with lived and bodily experiences, accepting emotions of all genders is a critical first step in making a more inclusive polis. New emotions offer forms of cognition, just as the wisdom that is attached to women’s bodily experiences can offer new political insight.
In summation, then, the goal of this essay has been to put forth a multi-dimensional argument. The first of these dimensions points out that emotions have always existed in politics, although it is true that their presence/effect has increased over time. What we are concerned with, then, is not the question of integrating emotions into politics for the first time, but instead, as the second part of the argument points out, to make space for the emotions of women, which differ in important ways than the mainstream, though equally valuable ones of men. A byproduct of doing so will be the acceptance of the bodily experiences of women, which are both highly interconnected with their emotions and thoroughly different than those of men. Overall, doing so will make a more representative polis - one that could not be achieved through reason alone.
